Liquid organic hydrogen carriers (LOHC) are a technology that allows storing hydrogen in a safe and dense manner by reversible chemical conversion. They constitute a very promising option for energy storage, transport, and release combined with electric power generation by fuel cells in large-scale applications like trains. In order to establish trains running on LOHC, it is mandatory to ensure the reliability of the system. This study evaluates various system configurations concerning reliability and resilience. The fault tree analysis method has been used to quantify the probability of failure. The S-P matrix was applied to assess the different failure modes in context of severity as well as their probability. The MTTF of the system can be more than doubled by introducing single redundancy for the fuel cell and the reactor, while more than two redundant components diminish the positive effect on reliability due to higher complexity. It is estimated that the systems full functionality is available for more than 97% of its operating time.
| INTRODUCTION
The railway systems currently represent the most important form of electric mobility. Modern trains are mostly operated by a permanent power supply via electrified tracks. However, a huge share of the railway tracks, even in highly industrialized countries, is not electrified. Electrification of these secondary lines is expensive. Thus, trains operating on such tracks are usually diesel-electric driven. The respective diesel engines cause emissions of hazardous substances like soot or nitrous oxides. For the future, a replacement by locomotives that can operate locally emission free and independent of electrified tracks is an essential target. Batteries could theoretically work as storage technologies for trains, but the energy density is low leading to an insufficient range. Hence, batteries might be suited for bridging short gaps in power supply. 1 Yet, for long-distance travel, other storage technologies, providing higher energy densities, are needed. An interesting option is trains driven by hydrogen. Some demonstration projects have already been realized for hydrogen trains. 2 Nevertheless, the energy density of compressed hydrogen is still insufficient for many applications.
A promising approach to overcome this problem is represented by the LOHC technology. [3] [4] [5] LOHCs (liquid organic hydrogen carrier) store hydrogen in a chemical bonded form through reversible, catalytic hydrogenation. Particularly, platinum catalysts show good performance in hydrogen release from LOHCs. 6 The huge advantage is that it can be stored safely at ambient conditions. Neither high pressure nor low temperatures are needed. Thus, heavy vessels for pressurized hydrogen are avoided. On the other hand, a hydrogen release unit (ie, a chemical reactor for the dehydrogenation reaction) is needed. These boundary conditions make the LOHC technology particularly interesting for large-scale applications like trains.
A number of substances have been proposed as LOHCs. Prominent examples are toluene 7, 8 and N-ethyl carbazole. 9 Yet, these carriers come with a number of unfavorable properties. Most of these issues are overcome by the carrier system dibenzyl toluene (H0-DBT) and its hydrogenated form perhydro dibenzyl toluene (H18-DBT). The substance pair is technically highly interesting because H0-DBT is already produced on industrial scale as a heat transfer fluid and is offered on the market at favorable prices (2-5 € kg −1 depending on the purchase quantity). Furthermore, the relevant substance data are known and the safety characteristics such as flash point, ignition temperature, and toxicity are unproblematic. Therefore, the substance pairing is not classified as a dangerous good, which is an important aspect for the introduction of a new energy carrier in rail transport. The biggest advantage of H18/H0-DBT compared to the competing LOHC material N-ethyl carbazole is its liquid state at room temperature, which is the decisive advantage for mobile applications. 10, 11 If trains are supposed to run on hydrogen stored in LOHCs, it is mandatory to ensure a reliable operation of the technology. Like all new concepts for energy storage on trains (including batteries and compressed hydrogen), knowledge on reliability is currently limited. Yet, some works on this topic exist. Probability of failure and resilience of LOHC systems have been assessed in a previous study. 12 However, this evaluation rather concerned general aspects of the LOHC technology. In this work, we present a study of LOHC systems specifically designed for applications in trains. This study takes boundary conditions of railway application like vibrations, acceleration, and other forms of mechanical stress into account. As a primary objective, probability of failure of LOHC driven trains is evaluated. In further steps, potential risks and total operational readiness considering repair are taken into account.
| SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The LOHC storage, release, and conversion unit for the operation of a train is based on the technical performance requirements of an emission-free train. The train should have a top speed of 140 km h −1 and a range of 550 km. 13 The most important units of the system are the tanks, the reactor, the hydrogen purification, and the fuel cell. We assume a total amount of 178 kg hydrogen is required for electricity generation in the fuel cell (FC). In addition, a further 105 kg of hydrogen is needed to ensure heat supply in the reactor for the endothermic dehydrogenation reaction. The LOHC that is fueled has a loading degree of >99%, while the loading degree of the used LOHC is about 10%. This leads to a total tank volume of 5580 L of LOHC. For the sake of simplicity, the P&ID flow chart only shows two tanks, one for the loaded LOHC and one for the unloaded LOHC. However, the aim was to integrate eight 800-L tanks into the system, seven of which will initially be filled with loaded LOHC and one of which will remain empty. This multitank approach reduces by coordinated emptying and filling the spatial requirements compared to a simple two-tank system for charged and discharged LOHC.
The loaded LOHC material is pumped out of the tanks by the pump C-1 controlled by the flow sensor F-1. To disconnect the tank from the pump, the valve V-1 is installed. In order to avoid a return flow from the reactor into the tanks, a one-way valve V-2 is installed. Since the discharged LOHC leaves the reactor with a temperature of about 300°C, 14 the fed H18-DBT is preheated in the heat exchanger H-1 by this product stream. The unloaded LOHC flows through the valve V-4 into the tank that is used to collect the unloaded material. Before the loaded LOHC is let into the head of the reactor, it flows through the heat exchanger H-2, cooling the mixture of released hydrogen, and evaporated LOHC leaving the reactor. To control the flow rate of the reactant, another valve V-3 is installed in front of the inlet to the top of the reactor. Because the reactor is located in a constantly moving system, it is designed as a vertical tube bundle reactor. In these reactor types, the liquid in the reactor is hardly influenced by frequent acceleration or changes of tilt during travel. The reactor is temperature controlled by the sensor T-1 in the middle of its reaction zone. In addition, a pressure sensor P-1 is fitted to the top of the reactor for monitoring and controlling the reactor. A solid filter at the bottom of the reactor filters the discharged LOHC, removes possible decomposition products, and prevents fouling in the heat exchanger. A hydrogen pressure tank is connected to the reactor via the valve V-10 to allow purging the reactor during start-up and shutdown with inert gas to keep it in a stable standby state without deactivation of the catalyst and provide energy for cold start-ups (this later functionality could be supported by a battery, but this option is not further considered in this study to keep the focus on the LOHC technology). The reactor is operated at 1-5 bar overpressure. 14 The outlet for the product gas is at the top of the reactor, as well as the safety valve V-9, which protects the vessel against overpressure. The hydrogen gas stream that contains LOHC vapor is cooled in the subsequent heat exchanger H-2. A certain share of the LOHC is condensed in the connected overpressure droplet separator and fed back into the main LOHC feed line to the reactor. Through the valve V-5, the product flow is expanded to normal pressure and then cooled to condense the LOHC vapor in the hydrogen stream. The water cooling circuit is controlled by the temperature sensor T-2. The normal pressure droplet separator splits the product stream into a condensed LOHC stream and a hydrogen stream. Since the boiling point of the loaded species is 35°C lower than the one of the unloaded, a high residual load of the LOHC-steam can be expected. Thus, the organic carrier returns to the line, which conveys the reactant from the tank, while the hydrogen flows to the next purification unit. 15 Fuel cell specifications demand a contamination level of the hydrogen stream of less than 2 ppm hydrocarbons. 16 The purity is guaranteed by an activated carbon filter. The hydrogen flow is split and fed to the H 2 burner and the fuel cell unit by a T-fitting.
The H 2 flow for the H 2 burner is controlled via the flow sensor F-3 and the pneumatic valve V-6. The burner is also supplied with ambient air via a fan C-3 controlled by the pressure sensor P-2. The combustion of oxygen and hydrogen heats a heat transfer fluid in the heat exchanger H-3, which supplies the reactor with the necessary heat for the dehydrogenation. The temperature sensor T-3 is used to monitor the heat input and to control the burner. The pump C-2 controlled by the flow sensor F-2 transports the heat transfer fluid from the burner to the reactor and back.
The remaining hydrogen is fed to the fuel cell (FC). An electric output of 400 kW of the FC must be provided for the train. The FC is supplied with compressed air via the compressor C-4, designed as turbo or screw compressor, 17, 18 and controlled by the pressure sensor P-4 and the valve V-8. The connection to the hydrogen line is monitored by the pressure sensor P-3. The valve V-7 allows a (dis-)connection of the FC. It is assumed that the humidifier, the cooling system, and the aerator are already integrated in FCs, which is why these components are not considered separately.
The described system (see Figure 1 ) represents the basic scenario. To identify the most reliable system configuration, different scenarios have been evaluated. Since the fuel cell unit has a high probability of failure, the first step is to design this part of the system more reliably. For the FC unit, the operation performance is assumed as a failure as soon as it provides less than 50% of the maximum power. By installing several FCs with a lower specific power, the failure of several individual FCs is possible without a failure of the overall system. To increase reliability, setup No. 2 assumes installation of an additional FC (including a compressor for provision of air). This configuration further involves two additional valves and two pressure sensors. This new unit is connected by another T-piece to the hydrogen line. For this consideration, it is sufficient if the FCs have an output of 200 kW each in order to provide the required 400 kW to power the train.
In setup No. 3, a total of three FCs has been considered. This is achieved by adding the same components as in the previously described setup and connecting them to the hydrogen line by another T-piece. To get 400 kW power, it is sufficient if every FC has an output of 133 kW. In further scenarios, the number of FCs, compressors, and auxiliary components is stepwise increased, while the specific power per FC is reduced until the optimum number of FCs has been found.
In a second step, the reactor with all its attached components is arranged redundantly. Two pumps with connected flow sensors are required to transport the reactant to the respective reactor. In addition, the two heat exchangers H-1 and H-2, which preheat the loaded LOHC, must be implemented twice. The same holds for the reactor, with all its sensors and valves. Since the droplet separator is installed directly behind the heat exchanger, which cools the hydrogen-LOHC-gas mixture, it also has to be built redundantly.
The last setup should create the greatest possible reliability. Therefore, a redundant design of the reactors should be taken into account as well. For this scenario, the number of FCs in the system is chosen according to the number of FCs in one of the first four setups that implies the most reliable system structure.
| Data for MTTF and assumptions for MTTR
Details on input parameters for the MTTF and the MTTR can be found in the electronic supporting information. Assumptions and estimations are made for the MTTR. A dense net of workshops spanning the rail network and sufficient availability of technicians has been assumed. Most of the replacement parts are presumed to be in stock and available. Only spontaneous and unpredictable failures that require expensive spare parts delay the repair by 24 hours. In addition, a longer MTTR was assigned to failures, which are difficult to find, as well as failures where special technicians are required.
| RELIABILIT Y AND RESILIENCE
Reliability is the probability to fulfill a function under defined conditions for a certain period of time. It is subject to stochastic processes and can be described qualitatively as the ability of something to remain functional and quantitatively as the probability of failure-free operation. 19 Resilience in engineering context describes the ability of a technical system to successfully deal with disruptions, particularly through adaptability or the ability to reduce vulnerability. Despite damages or partial failures, the system should not fail completely, but maintain essential system requirements. Resilience also describes the ability to recover from a failure and successfully adapt. 20 Besides the consideration of systems reliability, the analysis of resilience has increased in the field of engineering sciences. 21 Gasser et al 22 lined out the necessity of the four key functions resist, restabilize, rebuild, and reconfigure for a resilient energy system. In a publication by McLellan et al, 23 social resilience to natural disasters for energy systems is analyzed. The six criteria are continuity, robustness, independence, controllability, matched to demand, and nonhazardousness. In addition, resilience analyses exist for hydrogen systems in the case of natural catastrophes, 24 networks completely based on renewable energies, 25 and storage by means of compressed and liquid hydrogen. 26 O'Brien and Hope 27 pointed out that the new decentralized energy supply is more resilient in contrast to vulnerable and centralized networks. In the work of Rüde et al, 12 some of us were the first ones to analyze a LOHC-based storage system with regard to resilience.
| Failure
The failure of a part or component describes the deviation from the performance criteria. A failure occurs as soon as the required function of the considered object is not fulfilled or the degree of fulfillment falls below a certain threshold. Errors made during the design, construction, or building of the system are not considered failures. In contrast, an initially correctly designed and constructed system is assumed. The criterion of failure defines in which state of the component failure is assumed. 19 
| Criterion of failure
A failure occurs, when a component no longer fulfills its requirements and leads to failure of the overall system. For example, a failure of a pump causes an interruption of LOHC supply and a termination of hydrogen release. It is more difficult to define a failure in case of degradation or whether the failure does not lead to observable failure of other elements of the system. For instance, small leakage of a LOHC line or slow decrease of power provided by a FC does not lead directly to failure of the entire system. Hence, a failure criterion must be defined for such cases. 28 While MTTF is used to describe objects that cannot be repaired, mean time between failures (MTBF) is assigned to components that can be repaired. If the repair time is comparatively short, it is reasonable to assume that MTTF equals MTBF. The values are calculated by the ratio between the total duration of the observation period in hours and the total number of failures. The reciprocal value corresponds to the failure rate λ or probability of failure, which is given in h −1 . 19, 29 In this study, constant failure rates over time λ(t) = λ are assumed.
| Mean time to/between failure

| Mean time to repair
The mean time to repair/restoration (MTTR) of an element indicates how long it takes after a failure until the maintenance work has been completed and the component is ready for use. Different factors influence the duration of the MTTR (What kind of personnel is required? Are spare parts in stock? and Is on-site repair possible?). Projectable service work is not considered as it can be carried out during regular downtime. 29 
| FTA
Fault tree analysis 30 is a method of reliability analysis of technical systems and equipment. It uses Boolean algebra to determine the probability of a system to fail. The FTA methodology is internationally standardized in the EN 61025 standard as well as nationally in Germany in DIN 25424. 31, 32 The relationship in fault trees between events is represented by logical gates. Starting from the top event, which usually describes an unwanted state, the tree expands by gates and events. This top-down analysis is applied until the system is mapped into basic events that cannot be further subdivided. An event defines the occurrence of a system state that characterizes a fault, while gates are presented by logical operators.
The different events are logically linked by gates whereby the shape of the gate defines the kind of linkage. By using an "OR" function, the failure of a single element is sufficient to fulfill the superordinate failure event. If a component or functional module is designed twice but not required two times for trouble-free operation, the principle of redundancy is fulfilled and the events are linked by an "AND" function. This means that all input events must occur for the output event to be fulfilled. 31 An important assumption for quantitative fault tree analysis is independence of the basic events. Events are considered to be independent if the probability of occurrence of an event is not influenced by the occurrence of the other event. The fault tree represents a statistical model in which only direct dependencies between events can be expressed. 31 A fault tree can be quantitatively analyzed by Boolean algebra. Variables are used for the events that can only assume two possible values, either a logical "0" (ie, "FALSE") or a logical "1" (ie, "TRUE"). The gates are represented by logical operators. Since the logical operator "AND" and "OR" are of interest in this work, only this part of Boolean algebra will be discussed in the following. 29 
| Probability
In random experiments, a probability P(E) between zero and one is assigned to each elementary event E. The value "0" corresponds to an impossible event, that is, one that cannot occur, and the value "1" to the certain event, which will occur in any case. The probability of the logical "AND" combination of two independent events E1 and E2 with the probability P(E1) and P(E2) is calculated by the product of the two single probabilities. 33, 34 The calculation of logical "OR"-linking differs from nonexclusive and exclusive events. The failure probabilities of different components of a system are not mutually exclusive. This means that the failure of a compressor and the failure of a valve can occur simultaneously. Yet, the probabilities of the elementary events cannot simply be added. Otherwise, the overlapping event set would count twice. In this case, the product of the two probabilities is subtracted from the sum of the two probabilities 33, 34 :
Therefore, in this work, the basic events are considered independent and not mutually exclusive. That is, the failure of one component does not influence the failure probability of another component and does not exclude the occurrence of another failure at the same time. 34 
| Point availability
The point availability (PA) of an element specifies the probability whether this element fulfills its required functions under given conditions at a certain point in time. Assuming constant failure and recovery rates over time, point availability is calculated as follows.
The PA of a system consisting of n elements connected in series is calculated according to Equation (4). 29 (1)
| S-P matrix
The analysis of a system using the S-P matrix is derived from the failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), which is an analytical method of reliability engineering. Therein, key figure for the severity S of an error and its probability of occurrence P are assigned to each potential error. These key figures assume values between one and ten (note that probability classes on the y-axis represent rather a logarithmic than a linear scale of the failure rate). Possible damages are mapped in a matrix for classifying the risk in order to determine the need for action. 35 Criteria for the assignment of specific values for the key numbers assumed in this study are given in the electronic supporting information.
There are countless examples for the application of different reliability analyses. Kishita et al 36 investigated the resilient design of energy systems with the help of the FTA. Through reliability analysis, the frequency of different accident scenarios of pressurized H 2 storages, 37 the safety of hydrogen filling stations, 38 and the reliability of hybrid renewable energies were analyzed. 39 FMEA and FTA are used in the field of FCs mainly to determine the degradation in voltage per hour. 40, 41 In addition, fault trees are used to evaluate FC safety, 42 reliability, availability, and maintainability. 43 
| RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A failure rate based on literature references is assigned to each component installed in the hydrogen storage, release, and conversion unit. By combining the failure rates of components with an identical functionality such as valves, the number of different system components could be reduced to 18. Failures in control engineering, software, and electronics have not been considered in this study. Figure 1 shows an overview of the failure rates of the various components of the system.
The element with the highest failure rate is the hydrogen burner ( Figure 2 ). This high probability of failure is due to the fact that these burners are subject of ongoing research and have not yet reached market maturity. 44 Analyzing the failure rate of conventional gas burners and taking into account the early stage of development, the MTTF results with 4.000 hours for the hydrogen burner. Because of continuous development and research as well as the gaining of operating experience, it can be assumed that hydrogen burners will achieve a longer mean time to failure in the future, thus enabling a more reliable operation. Higher reliability of the heating system could be achieved by using electric heating. However, efficiency and power density of the system are much lower in this operation mode. Especially for mobile application like trains, which require high power densities, electric heating is not a meaningful option. Quite interesting in terms of efficiency and power densities could be systems with integrated dehydrogenation and high-temperature fuel cell. That way, waste heat from the fuel cell could be utilized for dehydrogenation. However, this technological approach is still in an early stage of development and meaningful statements on reliability are not yet possible.
The second most susceptible components are the heat exchangers used for preheating the H18-DBT, for transferring heat from the hydrogen burner to the reactor and for cooling the hydrogen stream and thus protecting the FC. Each heat exchanger has a MTTF of 23 500 hours, which results in a MTTF of 5900 hours for the assembly. The presence of external as well as internal leaks can cause overheating of the component. In addition, fouling on the walls of a plate or tube bundle heat exchanger can limit its function. 45 By appropriate operation, utilizing LOHC without impurities and filtering, for example, catalyst particles at the outlet of the reactor, fouling can be avoided. It is assumed that no corrosion occurs since no corrosion agent is present. Again, innovations are not to be expected to extend the life time of heat exchangers due to the maturity of the technology. Only the reduction in the number of heat exchangers would increase the reliability while the energy efficiency would decrease.
The failure rate of the reactor vessel itself is very low. This is because of the fact that all connections, sensors, and valves are regarded separately. In addition, failure scenarios such as catalyst deactivation or blockage are not considered here because they do not occur suddenly and can be repaired during regular maintenance work.
In the following, the question is analyzed how and to what extent the reliability of the system can be increased by implementing redundancy. Table 1 shows the results for the fault tree analysis of the six different system scenarios. The difference between the first and the second setup is that the complete FC unit is doubled, and the specific power of the FCs is halved. The new FC unit is attached to the hydrogen line by connecting it via a T-piece. This modification changes the failure criterion from zero to one possible failure of the FCs. In addition, the failure of one compressor does not lead to the failure of the entire system, but only to the failure of one FC, which is in line with the new failure criterion. By adding this redundancy to the system, the MTTF s increases by around 16.7%.
Setup No. 3 is to find out whether further FC units and a lower specific FC output can again increase reliability. However, the FTA shows that the MTTF remains constant by this increased redundancy. Only the failure rate increases slightly (ie, MTTF decreases, yet, the difference in MTTF is very small and still within the margin of uncertainty). It can be concluded that increasing redundancy beyond a certain threshold has no positive or even a negative effect on reliability.
In order to prove this effect, setup No. 4, where another FC was added, was analyzed. Although the number of possible FC failures required to not fulfill the failure criterion increased from 1 to 2, the MTTF decreases slightly by around 80 hours. As a consequence, this additional redundancy increases the failure rate. This effect can be traced back to the increasing number of sensors and valves and an increasing line length.
To verify this effect, the FC unit with the stack, a connected compressor, and the necessary valves and sensors has been evaluated (see Figure 3 ). The number of FC units in the system is then stepwise increased, and the specific output of the cells is reduced. The availability criterion is fulfilled as long as at least 50% of the maximum power is provided. Degradation mechanisms are not considered, since they are predictable and part of the maintenance intervals. The results for the failure rate for the different numbers of FC units are shown in Figure 4 . The failure rate is plotted logarithmically. The system structure with the lowest MTTF is the one with the simple design of all components without redundancy. Introducing simple redundancy increases the MTTF by a factor of about 41. This is achieved by the redundancy effect of the second FC. Adding another redundant FC does not change the failure criterion and the MTTF is reduced by a factor of two. After reaching the maximum reliability or the minimum failure rate for two FC units, the reliability decreases continuously with increasing number of FC units. Changing the system from two to four FCs reduces the MTTF by a factor of about three, and raising the number of FCs to eight reduces the MTTF by a factor of about seven. This can be attributed to a sharp increase in the number of auxiliary components and connections, which can all fail, overcompensating the [40] [41] [42] [43] ). As a second case, starting from the basic scenario again, the reactor with all its auxiliary components is designed redundantly. This modification increases the MTTF from 960 hours to 1500 hours compared to the basic scenario. The redundant design of the reactor and especially of the connected components represents a much more reliable structure than a system with a single reactor and a more reliable FC system. As two FC units represent the most reliable configuration in the one reactor system, the combination of these configurations has been evaluated. This change has enabled the failure rate to be significantly reduced once again. The MTTF increases from 1500 hours to 1930 hours. By making changes in the sense of a reliable and redundant design of the reactor and the FC unit, the MTTF of the basic scenario could be more than doubled. This means that setup No. 6 comprises the most advisable configuration for an onboard hydrogen release and power generation unit in terms of reliability.
With a point availability exceeding 97% for all setups, the uptime is fairly high. Assuming an operating time of 6000 h a −1 , which corresponds to a daily operating time of around 16.5 hours, the setup No. 1 has only 90-hour downtime. The most reliable system configuration with a PA s of 97.8% has already 132-hour downtime. The reason for this is that the calculation of the PA s is only defined for elements connected in series. Redundancy is not taken into account. Thus, the PA s does not apply to the functionality of the system but refers to the time in which single components do not work, whereas the operation of the train could be still possible. Table 2 shows that the PA s of the various setups decreases with the number of components installed. It is assumed that predictable failures such as catalyst deactivation or FC power degradation will be remedied during train downtimes in the course of service work. Figure 5 shows the S-P matrix, which displays the most critical component failures. If a component has several failure modes, only the one in which the product of severity S and the probability of occurrence P have the highest value is displayed. In the present analysis, there is no failure rated with P of five or higher, because all installed and considered parts have a higher reliability. Failures with the highest severity are those that endanger life. Leakages or destruction of hydrogen-carrying components could theoretically create an explosive environment. Explosion would be possible as soon as a dry hydrogen/ air mixture reaches a hydrogen concentration of 4 vol%. 46 Hence, it is necessary to integrate a fume outlet and to have no ignition sources near hydrogen gas carrying elements. Additionally, all components accessible to people must be sufficiently electrically insulated to exclude the risk of electric shocks.
A failure of the pumps is comparatively likely and causes failure of the system. Therefore, a redundant design should be considered. Failure of the H 2 burner can occur often but with a low severity as it only comes to a shutdown after some time due to thermal inertia. As already mentioned, the ongoing research and development will most likely increase this MTTF. FCs and compressors work more reliably than H 2 burners but their failure leads to immediate failure of the train (as long as no respective redundancy is implemented). As the reactor operates at temperatures above 300°C and at overpressure, the destruction of the vessel can cause considerable damage. A collecting tray can prevent environmental pollution even if one of the LOHC tanks is destroyed. The frequency and significance of other failures is so low that no immediate need for action arises.
| CONCLUSION
The reliability and the operational resilience of a hydrogen release and power generation system based on the LOHC technology have been evaluated. Failures of the individual components of the system have been assessed with regard to their severity and probability of occurrence based on a use scenario of a public train. The hydrogen burner and the heat exchangers have been identified as the most failure-prone elements. The analysis outlines that the reliability can be increased by minimizing the number of auxiliary components and connections. Various system configurations have been compared using the FTA, with the result that adding too much redundancy can lead to a loss of reliability. The analysis of the FC system shows that single redundancy implies the greatest reliability. Additional components overlap the expected positive effect on reliability due to a more complex system with additional failure probabilities. The system with the best reliability comprises of two redundant FCs and two reactors. Under the assumptions made in this study, a PA s of over 97% can be achieved. The most serious failures of individual components are those that cause the system to fail immediately and lead to environmental damage or endanger life. Avoidance measures include complete ventilation of the system to remove leaking hydrogen, adequate electrical insulation, and a sufficient, but not excessive redundant system design. Cost analysis and economic comparison to other concepts for powering trains are not part of this study. Yet, for nonelectrified tracks LOHC powered trains have the potential to become economically beneficial to both, electrification of little frequented tracks and alternative technologies for onboard storage. For more details on the economics of the LOHC technology, the respective literature is recommended. 47, 48 
